

# **Funding The Proposed Lake Powell Pipeline**

- **Taxes (Property Tax)**
- **Fees**
- **Impact Fees**
- **OR ---- Some Combination of Each**


# Property Tax

**Presents Two Challenges to Public Policy:**

- 1. Tax Capitalization**
- 2. Subsidized Prices**

# **Capitalization: A Modest Example**


# Property Tax Example: Burdens and Benefits



**Developed  
Land:  
Existing  
Residents**

**Undeveloped  
Land:  
New  
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
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# Capitalization of Property Tax Into Property Market Value: A Simple Example

- How much will you pay for a business with a annual net income of \$10,000?
- The required rate of return is 5%.
- You can invest \$200,000 in a bond at 5% and make \$10,000 annually.
- Or ---
- You can pay \$200,000 for the business and earn \$10,000 annually.
- If the property tax (or any expense) is increased by \$5,000 annually the net income is now \$5,000.
- How much do you need to invest to return \$5,000?
- The amount at 5% return is now \$100,000.
- The loss in income from the increase in the property tax has decreased the value of the firm by \$100,000.

$$V = \sum_{i=0}^{i=n} \frac{I_i - C_i}{(1+r)^i}$$

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**This example of capitalization  
assumes few direct benefits accrue  
to the existing residents from the  
increase in the property tax.**

# Selected Empirical Evidence of Property Tax Capitalization


- W. Oates, *Journal of Political Economy*, 1969
- M. Feldstein, *Journal of Political Economy*, 1974
- C. Lewis & P. McNutt, *AREUEA Journal*, 1979
- W. Wheaton, *National Tax Journal*, 1984
- J. Lillywhite, *Utah State University, M.S. Thesis*, 1979
- E. Glaser, *Public Choice*, 1996
- H. Ladd & K. Bradbury, *National Tax Journal*, 1998
- O. Palmon & B. Smith, *Journal of Political Economy*, 1998
- A. Rangel, *American Economic Review*, 2008
- D. Stadleman & R. Eichenberger, *Southern Economic Journal*, 2012
- N. Kuminoff & J. Pope, *International Economic Review*, 2014

# **Property Tax: The Key Point of Capitalization**


- **If property taxes and the goods and services they fund are not properly aligned employing property taxes will reduce the value of existing properties.**
- **For example, research has demonstrated that quality K-12 schools contribute to residential home values.**


$$V = \sum_{i=0}^{i=n} \frac{B_i - C_i}{(1+r)^i}$$

# Property Tax Capitalization



# **Subsidized Prices**







**Fees**

# Efficient Pricing: Market Allocation of Water

- Fees ---reflect Standard Economic Policy ---  
**Whenever possible, local public services should be charged for...**
- Fees --- if correctly imposed contribute to economic efficiency by revealing consumer choice. They allow a market resolution to satisfy both the demand and the supply of water.

# **The Market Allocation of Water**

- **Fees --- insure that infrastructure costs are imposed on the consumers that benefit**
- **Fees --- remove the inequity issue between current residents and future residents**

# Market Allocation of Water

- The price elasticity (the rate of change in consumption when price changes) for residential water use has estimated by economists to be *inelastic*.
- Meta Analysis:
  - 124 Studies, -.38 to -.51, Espey, *et al*, 1997
  - 300 Studies, -.41, Dalhuisen, *et al*, 2003
- 11 Cities, -.33, Olmstead, 2007
- 10% increase reduces consumption by 3% to 4% -- Short Run
- 10% increase reduces consumption by 6% -- Long Run

# Market Allocation of Water


- Fees --- fully inform consumers because they take away the subsidy that exists when property tax revenues are used to fund infrastructure
- Fees --- allow more freedom to use the property tax to fund activities where the use of fees is not feasible: **K-12**, Police, Fire, etc.
- Marginal cost pricing is the key to efficiency.
- Pricing based on the LRMC becomes significant when water becomes scarce

# **Impact Exactions**

# Impact Fees

- **Impact fees are one-time levies determined by a schedule/formula adopted by a local government that are assessed on developers during the land permitting process.**
- **Imposed on new development to fund the infrastructure**

# Impact fee Example: Burdens and Benefits




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
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
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
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
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# Property Tax Capitalization



# Property Tax Capitalization



# The Economics of Impact Fees

- **Efficient outcomes occur when news residents and decision makers confront market prices that reflect the full costs and benefits of their actions.**
- **Impact fees that are predetermined reduce risk and make development decisions more predictable. (Preferable to a position of no growth.)**
- **Impact fees need to account for the marginal cost of development.**

# The Economics of Impact Fees

- **Marginal cost and average cost impact fees**
- **Consider two distinct developments**
  - One close to community center and one located far from the city center
  - The cost of providing water to the close development is lower than the cost of providing to the distant development
- **Rational impact fees will account for the difference (marginal cost) of the distant development.**

# The Economics of Impact Fees

- Who bears the burden?
- Depends on the relative elasticity of the supply and demand for housing
  - Buyers in exclusive areas are likely to bear the burden of the impact fee. However, if a buyer is not interested in the amenities of the exclusive area the options of other areas suggest that the landowner/developer will bear the cost of the impact fee.
  - Impact fee study in Contra Costa, California. Desirable area a \$1 increase in impact fee added \$1.88 increase in housing cost and a \$1 increase in a less wealthy area increased housing cost by \$.23. Dresch & Sheffrin (1997)
- Developer, buyer, or land owner?
- Research?
- Do they slow economic development?



# Summary

- **Property tax to fund “lumpy” water infrastructure creates inequities in the distribution of the burden and the benefits**
- **Especially when the burden of the costs do not correspond to the distribution of the benefits**
- **Subsidized fees (because of support by property tax) creates inefficient outcomes**
- **Properly implemented fees create efficient outcomes in water demand**
- **Impact fees internalize the costs and the benefits of water infrastructure**

